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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.

:

Case No. 940500-CA

:

TRACY ALAN CANDELARIO,
Defendant-Appellant.

:

Priority No. 2

:

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals a firearm enhancement of one year imposed
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(2) (1990), following his
conviction of robbery, a second degree felony, in the Third
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, the Honorable Timothy
R. Hanson presiding.

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to

Utah Code Ann. 78-2a-3 (2) (f) (Supp. 1995).
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Does the term "representation of a firearm" as used in the
firearm enhancement statute include an oral statement that one
has a firearm?
"'The appropriate standard of review for a trial court's
interpretation of statutory law is correction of error.'"
v. Adams, 830 P.2d 310, 313 (Utah App.), cert, denied,

State

843 P.2d

1042 (Utah 1992) (quoting State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 796 (Utah
1991) .

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (1990).
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be
sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as
follows:
(2) In the case of a felony of the second degree, for a
term at not less than one year nor more than 15 years
but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile
or the representation of a firearm was used in the
commission or furtherance of the felony, the court shall
additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of
one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and
the court may additionally sentence the person convicted
for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to
run consecutively and not concurrently;
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information dated 15 December 1993
with aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1990) (R. 9-10).

He pled guilty to

robbery, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-301 (1990) (R. 27-28) . The court imposed the statutory term
of imprisonment, including a mandatory one-year firearm
enhancement (R. 3 0-31) . Defendant timely appealed (R. 34).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 30, 1994, defendant entered a credit union,
confronted cashier Michelle Neff, and demanded money.

He said he

had a gun and would kill her if she did not comply (R. 10, 20,
58, 67). Defendant did not display a firearm and in fact did not
have one, but intended to scare the cashier (R. 58). She
believed that he had a gun and gave him $2,000 (R. 58, 67).

2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
At issue on this appeal is whether the statutory phrase
"the representation of a firearm" as used in the firearm
enhancement statute includes an oral statement that the
perpetrator has a firearm.
Defendant waived this claim below by assuring the trial
court that it had "discretion" to impose a firearm enhancement.
However, it is clear from statements by the sponsor of the
passage at issue that the Utah Legislature intended to enhance
the sentence of a person who, like defendant, "represents that he
has a firearm."

The rule of lenity has no application where, as

here, the intent of the legislature is apparent.
ARGUMENT
THE TERM "REPRESENTATION OF A FIREARM" AS USED IN THE
FIREARM ENHANCEMENT STATUTE INCLUDES AN ORAL
REPRESENTATION THAT THE PERPETRATOR HAS A FIREARM
At issue on this appeal is whether the statutory phrase "the
representation of a firearm" includes an oral statement that the
perpetrator has a firearm, or whether some physical likeness of a
firearm is required.
Under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(2) (1990), a person
convicted of a second degree felony is subject to sentence
enhancements "if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile

3

or the representation of a firearm was used in the commission or
furtherance of the felony" (emphasis added)-1
The trial court here imposed an additional one-year prison
term.

It reasoned that although defendant did not employ an

actual firearm or physical facsimile, he made an oral
representation of a firearm, which satisfies the statute where
the victim believes the representation and thus "the fear is
still there" (R. 51).
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in construing
the term "representation" to include his oral statement to the
cashier that he had a gun.

Br. of Appellant at 9.

A. Defendant waived this claim by assuring the
district court imposition of a firearms enhancement
was within its discretion.
Defendant waived his challenge to the firearm enhancement by
pleading guilty with the express understanding that the firearm
enhancement could be imposed and informing the trial court that
imposing the enhancement was within the court's discretion.
Defendant's guilty plea was unconditional.

As part of the

plea process, defendant ,and his counsel signed a Statement of
Defendant, Certificate of Counsel, and Order (R. 19-25, addendum
A).

In that document, defendant states that the punishment for

the crime to which he is pleading guilty includes a gun

1

A consecutive one-year term is mandatory; an additional
consecutive term not to exceed five years is discretionary. Utah
Code Ann. § 76-3-2-3(2) (1990).
4

enhancement of one to five years (R. 19). The document also
(id.).

states that the prosecution will not seek the enhancement

At the plea hearing, defense counsel argued that the fact
that defendant did not actually possess a firearm was a
mitigating factor for the judge to consider in sentencing.

She

stated, "But Mr. Candelario is now aware, and it has been
included on this [written statement], that the Court must impose
one year if you find certain things, and it can be a
discretionary five" (R. -57-58) . She also conceded "that the
enhancement could conceivably apply" (R. 60; see also

61).

The

court later told defendant that the mandatory nature of the
firearm enhancement "does not preclude your attorney on your
behalf from suggesting to me that legally it does not apply in
this case" (R. 63).
However, at sentencing defense counsel did not argue that
the absence of an actual weapon made the firearm enhancement
illegal, only that it made the enhancement discretionary.

When

the court observed that the absence of a weapon "doesn't change
the necessity of imposing an enhancement of a firearm," defense
counsel replied in part, "I leave that to your discretion" (R.
49).

The court pressed the point:
THE COURT: The firearms enhancement applies if a
person makes a representation that they have a firearm,
even if they do not.
MS. WELLS: It does for purposes of elevating the
offense to aggravated robbery, yes. For purposes of an
enhancement, I think that that is less clear, and
becomes discretionary.
5

(R. 49-50).2
ff

[0]n appeal, a party cannot take advantage of an error

committed at trial when that party led the trial court into
committing the error."
1993).

State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah

Having repeatedly assured the trial court that it had

discretion to impose a firearms enhancement, defendant cannot on
appeal insist that the court committed error by imposing it.
In addition, defendant failed to preserve in the trial court
the legal theory he now advocates.

Defendant below consistently

relied on the distinction between a perpetrator with a firearm
and one without (R. 49, 50, 51, 57). On appeal, defendant
abandons that distinction and implicitly concedes that an actual
firearm is unnecessary under the statute.
Appellant at 11-12.

See, e.g., Br. of

Instead, he urges that the proper

distinction is between physical representations and verbal
representations.
Where an appellant failed to assert a particular ground for
relief in the trial court, an appellate court will not consider
that ground on appeal.

State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah

1985) (refusing to entertain warrantless search argument when
suppression was sought on other grounds in the trial court); Mel

2

"Threatening to use a dangerous weapon during the
commission of a robbery, regardless of whether one actually
possesses such a weapon, is sufficient for a charge of aggravated
robbery under section 76-6-302." State v. Adams, 83 0 P.2d 310,
(Utah App. 1992) (quoting State v. Hartmann, 783 P.2d 544,
547 (Utah 1989)) .
6

Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc., 758 P.2d 451,
455-56 & n.4 (Utah App.) (appellate court would not consider
argument raised for first time on appeal "for the purpose of
reversing the trial court" even though it might have done so "if
doing so would permit affirmance " ) , cert, denied,
(Utah 1988).

769 P.2d 819

This court should accordingly refuse to consider

defendant's claim on appeal.
However, were this Court to reach defendant's claim, it
would find it to be without merit.
B. The Legislature intended to enhance the sentence of
one who orally represents that he has a firearm.
"The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give
effect to the intent of the legislature in light of the purpose
the statute was meant to achieve."

Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d

111, 115 (Utah 1991) . The only purpose of rules of statutory
construction is to assist courts in performing that task.

Cullum

v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 857 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah 1993).
The construing court begins with the plain language of the
statute, State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993),
looking to the usually accepted meanings of those terms and
assuming that each was used advisedly and meant "literally,
unless such a reading is unreasonably confused or inoperable."
Savage Industries v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664, 670
(Utah 1991).
When the statutory language is ambiguous, the court looks to
legislative history and other sources to ascertain legislative
7

intent.

P.I.E. Emp. Fed. Credit Union v. Bass, 759 P.2d 1144,

1151 (Utah 1988) .
1.

The statute's plain language is ambiguous.

Defendant initially claims that the plain language of the
enhancement statute resolves this appeal in his favor.
Appellant at 9-13.

Br. of

On the contrary, the plain language of the

statute comfortably accommodates the trial court's reading.
Utah courts frequently turn to Black's Law Dictionary for
guidance on the meaning of common terms used in the Utah Code or
court rules.

See,

e.g.,

Alma Evans Trucking v. Roach, 714 P.2d

1147, 1148 (Utah 1986) ("child" as used in § 35-1-71); Mt.
Olympus Waters, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 877 P.2d 1271,
1274 (Utah App.) ("any" as used in § 59-12-104(24)), cert.
denied,

890 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1994); State v. One 1979 Pontiac

Trans Am, 771 P.2d 682, 685 (Utah App. 1989) ("bona fide" as used
in § 58-37-13); State v. Wright, 765 P.2d 12, 20 (Utah App. 1988)
(Garff, J., concurring) ("or" as used in Utah R. Evid.
609(a) (2)) .
The same is true for Ballentine's Law Dictionary.
e.g.,

See,

State v. Suniville, 741 P.2d 961, 963 (Utah 1987)

("facsimile" as used in § 76-6-302 (1) (a)); State v. Durrant, 561
P.2d 1056, 1057 (Utah 1977) ("criminal negligence" as used in §
76-5-201(1)), overruled

on other

grounds

P.2d 1226, 1228 (1979) .

8

by State v. Chavez, 605

Black's Law Dictionary's first definition of

representation

is "[a]ny conduct capable of being turned into a statement of
fact."

Black's Law Dictionary 1301 (6th ed. 1990).

Law Dictionary's first definition of representation

Ballentine's
is "[a]

statement of fact, truthful or untruthful." Ballentine's Law
Dictionary 1095 (3d ed. 1969).

Neither mentions the definition

that defendant urges, a "likeness, image, picture, etc."

Br. of

Appellant at 10-11.
Since the most common meaning of "representation" as used in
the law is "a statement of fact," the phrase "representation of a
firearm" as used in section 76-3-203(2) may be read as the trial
court read it, to include defendant's false statement that he had
a gun.

Consequently, assuming defendant's reading of the term

representation

is a possible reading, the statute is at the very

least ambiguous.
2. The legislature intended to enhance the sentence of
one who "represents that he has a firearm.11
The statute's legislative history resolves the ambiguity in
its wording.

The language at issue here was proposed by Senator

Rinstrom during the 1976 Utah legislative budget session:
Sen. Rinstrom:

Now, Mr. President, a second motion I would
have to amend this bill as follows is again in
those same places, calling your attention to
line 18 after the word "firearm," add these
words: "or a facsimile or the representation of
the same was used in the commission of a
felony."

Mr. President:

Or a facsimile or what?

9

Sen. Rinstrom:

"or a facsimile or the representation of the
same." Now, let me give you the example of
where I'm going. Sorry to report I represented
a young man on an armed robbery charge. I was
successful in finding him innocent. He later
was arrested on a second one and confessed to
eighteen armed robberies including the one that
I had represented him on, and he'd all done it
[sic] with a cap pistol. But the people at the
other end of that barrel didn't know what they
were facing, and they were just as in great
[sicl a shock and trauma as if a real gun had
been pointed to them. So I think that we ought
to include a facsimile. Or, this would also
include the man who has his hand in his pocket
and points it at you and says, "I have a gun
here, and if you don't hand over the cash, I'm
going to shoot you." So, what this amendment
would do is saying [sic] that if a person uses
a gun, its facsimile, or represents that he has
a firearm, he could equally be sentenced to an
additional five years. That's the purpose of
the amendment.

Senate Budget Session, Senate Floor Debate on House Bill 3,
January 26, 1976 at 1-2 (addendum B, emphasis added).
Two points emerge from this statement.

First, Senator

Rinstrom stated that he intended the amendment to enhance the
sentence of a person who "represents that he has a firearm."

He

used the term "represents" in the sense of making "a statement of
fact,"

Black's Law Dictionary at 1301; Ballentine's Law

Dictionary at 1095, the statement being, of course, that the
person has a firearm.

Displaying a physical likeness of a gun,

such as a finger in the pocket, is one way of representing that
you have a firearm, but it is not the only way.
suffice.

10

Words will also

Second, the stated purpose of the amendment was to protect
victims from the "shock and trauma" caused by believing they
might be shot.

The district court here divined this legislative

purpose, stating: "I can't see a dime's worth of difference if
you're the person standing there being robbed where a person
represents they have a firearm, or[,] whether or not it's
displayed, they believe you, the fear is still there" (R. 51,
emphasis added).
Defendant's admission to police that he wanted to "scare"
the teller demonstrates .that he intended to inflict the precise
harm that the legislature sought to protect against. Therefore,
construing the statutory term representation

to include verbal

representations such as defendant's advances the purpose of the
statute.3
Defendant's insistence that the firearm enhancement statute
may be invoked only if the perpetrator uses a physical likeness
of a gun would frustrate this legislative purpose.

One robber

might hold his finger up in his coat pocket and say, "Hand over
the money or I'll shoot."

Another might simply have his hand in

his coat pocket (without making any likeness of a gun) and say,
"I have a gun in my pocket.

Hand over the money or I'll shoot."

3

The legislature's desire to protect innocent persons from
terrifying threats, "whether or not the perpetrator actually
possesses a weapon," is a legitimate one. State v. Hartmann, 783
P.2d 544, 546-47 (Utah 1989) (holding that a verbal threat alone
satisfies the phrase "threatens the immediate use of a dangerous
weapon" as used in the aggravated burglary statute).
11

Under defendant's analysis, the first robber's sentence would be
enhanced, but the second robber's sentence would not.
There is nothing in the legislative history of the amendment
to suggest that the legislature intended this absurd result.
Anderson v. Utah County, 368 P.2d 912,

See

(Utah 1962) (stating

that court may consult legislative history to avoid absurd
construction of ambiguous statute).

Certainly the "shock and

trauma" Senator Rinstrom sought to protect against are present
equally in either case.
Defendant relies on the fact that the amendment's framers
discussed whether or under what circumstances pointing a finger
could constitute a representation.

Br. of Appellant at 15-16.

However, the hypothetical was not resolved on whether a physical
likeness was created, as defendant suggests, but on whether or
not "a reasonable man, if he was seeing that, would . . .
conclude that you had a firearm."

Senate Budget Session, Senate

Floor Debate on House Bill 3, January 26, 1976 at 2 (addendum B ) .
There can be no doubt that defendant here "represent[ed]
that he ha[d] a firearm."

As such, his conduct fell within the

intent of the drafters of the firearm enhancement provision.4

4

This conclusion is consistent with Utah case law. In
State v. Suniville, 741 P.2d 961 (Utah 1987), the supreme court
held that a finger in a coat pocket accompanied by verbal threats
to kill the robbery victim did not constitute use of "a firearm
or a facsimile of a firearm" under the aggravated robbery statute
then in effect, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1978). Id. at 965.
However, the terms representation
or represents
were not at
issue.
12

C. The rule of lenity does not apply here.
Finally, defendant relies on the "well established rule of
lenity," which dictates that statutory ambiguity be resolved in
favor of lenity and against the harsher of two possible
punishments.

Br. of Appellant at 16-17; see State v. Egbert, 748

P.2d 558, 562 n.3 (Utah 1987) (Durham, J., dissenting).5
1. Defendant failed to preserve this issue.
Defendant failed to preserve this legal theory in the
district court, where he never mentioned or argued it.
Where an appellant fails to assert a particular ground for
relief in the trial court, an appellate court will not consider
that ground on appeal.

Carter, 707 P.2d at 660; Mel Trimble Real

Estate, 758 P.2d at 456 & n.4.

Therefore, defendant is not

entitled to rely on the rule of lenity to seek reversal here.
See State v. Eason, 470 A.2d 688, 694 (Conn. 1984) (declining to
reach a claim of lenity that "was not raised by the defendant
when he entered his guilty plea" or "during the sentencing
hearing"), overruled

on other

grounds

by Paulsen v. Manson, 525

A.2d 1315, 1318 (Conn. 1987).

5

It is unclear how "well established" the rule of lenity
is in Utah. It has been cited only twice by Utah courts. It was
cited in dissent in Egbert, 748 P.2d at 562 n.3, and it was
discussed but not applied in State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 86-87
(Utah App. 1990) .
13

2. The rule of lenity may not be invoked to
frustrate legislative intent.
The rule of lenity "is a rule of statutory construction to
be applied only when [legislative] intent is ambiguous."
Castaldi v. United States, 783 F.2d 119, 121 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied,

476 U.S. 1172 (1986); accord,

State v. Webb, 790 P.2d

65, 86-87 (Utah App. 1990) (refusing to apply rule of lenity
where history of amendments to aggravated robbery statute
"evinces the legislature's intent"); Simpson v. United States,
435 U.S. 6, 13-15 (1978) (invoking lenity only after examining
legislative history); Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 178
(1958) (invoking the rule of lenity where statutory construction
"can be based on no more than a guess as to what Congress
intended").

Thus, the rule of lenity "operates only where there

is no contrary legislative intent."

State v. Pierce, 895 P.2d

25, 26 (Wash. App. 1995).
Here, the history of section 76-5-203(2) demonstrates that
the legislature intended the term representation
as well as physical representations.

See

supra

to include oral
point B.2.

Therefore, resort to the rule of lenity here is unnecessary and
would frustrate the clear intent of the legislature, which it is
the duty of the judicial branch to effectuate.

See State v.

Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 485 (Utah 1988).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the Court should affirm the trial
court's imposition of the sentence enhancement.
14

ORAL ARGUMENT AND WRITTEN OPINION
In the event a reply brief is filed, the State requests oral
argument.
appeal.

Otherwise, no argument is necessary to resolve this

Similarly, if this court agrees with the State that

defendant invited or failed to preserve the error he claims on
appeal, no written opinion is necessary.

Otherwise, a written

opinion interpreting the fi rear in. enhancement stati it€
useful addition to Utah case law.
RESPECTFULLY submitted on V ( July 1!
1995
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

sistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1 iieieby certify that ioui copies of the foregoing Briei
Appellee were hand-delivered this

July 1995 to an agent for:

DAVID V. FINLAYSON
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
424 East 500 South Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

FILED DISTRICT COURT

Third Judicial District

Lake County

District (Jour
State of Utah

'I HI. MATE Of I MAR

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL
AND ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.

fA^-UL
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Defendant.
Criminal No. W

COMES NOW,

m,

W

*3&F~S

the defendant in this case and

hereby acknowledges and certifies the following:
I have entered a plea of (guilty) (no contest) to the following crime(s):
DEGREE

CRIME & STATUTORY
PROVISION

PUNISHMENT
min/max and/or
Min. Mandatory ,.
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I have received a copy of the (charge) (information) against me, I have read it, and I
understand the nature and elements of the offense(s){for which J*am pleading (guilty) (no
contest).
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The elements of the crimefs) of which I am charged are as follows:
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Mywconduct, and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally liable, that
constitutes the elements of the crime(s) charged arenas follows:
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y n m entering this/these pleats) vouintarily and With knowledge and understanding of

the following facts:
1.

I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I

cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I recognize
that a condition of my sentence may be to require me to pay an amount, as determined by
the Court, to recoup thexost of counsel if so appointed for me.
2.

I (have not) (have) waived my right to counsel . If I have waived my right to

counsel, I have done~so knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily for the following reasons:
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3.

If I have waived my right to counsel, I have read this statement and under-

stand the nature and elements of the charges, my rights in this and other proceedings and the
consequences of my pil'cu oil |"unlf\
,4.

'^

J f I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is

I -'L ' "V / / •'',

^

' ''

•

. and I have had an opportunity to discuss this statement, myri^.Msand

the consequences of my guilty plea with my attorney.
5.

I know that I have a right to a trial by jury.

6.

I know that if I wish to have a trial I have the right to confront and uoss-

examnir < \-ilnesses against nut; or to have them «t "toss-examined by my attorney. 1 also know
that I have the right to compel my witness(es) by subpoena at State expense to testify in court
in my behalf.
7.

I know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf but if I choose not to do

so I cannot be compelled to testify or give evidence against myself and no adverse inferences
will be di awn against, i i ic if I do not testify.
8.

I know that if I wish to contest the charge against me I need only plead "not

guilty" and the matter will be set for trial, At the trial the State of Utah will have the burden
of proving each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a
jury the verdict must be unanimous.
9.
I

1 know thai unuku the Constitution of Utah 1

. were tried and convicted

or llbv the judge th.ii! 1 would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence to

the Utah Court of Appeals or, where allowed, the Utah Supreme Court, and that if I could
not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, those costs would be paid by the State.
10.

I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each offense to which

I plead (guilty) (no contest). I know that by pleading (guilty) (no contest) to an offense that
carries a minimum mandatory sentei ice tl lat I v< ill be subjectin

I

mandatory sentence foi that offense, I know that the sentences may be consecutive and may
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be for a prison term, fine, or both. I know that in addition to a fine, a (twenty-five [25%])
(eighty-five [85%]) surcharge, required by Utah Code Annotated 63-63a-4, will be imposed.
I also know that I may be ordered by the Court to make restitution to any victim(s) of my
crimes.
11.

I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive periods, or the fine for

additional amount, if my plea is to more than one charge. I also know that if I am on
probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been convicted
or to which I have pled guilty, my plea in the present action may result in consecutive
sentences being imposed upon me.
12.

I know and understand that by pleading (guilty) (no contest) I am waiving my

statutory and constitutional rights set out in the preceding paragraphs. I also know that by
entering such plea(s) I am admitting and do so admit that I have committed the conduct
alleged and I am guilty of the crime(s) for which my plea(s) is/are entered.
13.

My plea(s) of (guilty) (no contest) (is) (is not) the result of a plea bargain

between myself and the prosecuting attorney. The promises, duties and provisions of this
plea bargain, if any, are fully contained in the Plea Agreement attached to this affidavit.
14.

I know and understand that if I desire to withdraw my plea(s) of/tguilty) (no

contest), I must do so by filing a motion within thirty (30) days after entry of my plea.
15.

I know that any charge or sentencing concession or recommendation of

probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing made or
sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not biding on the judge. I
also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they believe the Court may do are
also not binding on the Court.
16.

No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind have been made to

induce me to plead guilty, and no promises except those contained herein and in the attached
plea agreement, have been made to me.

i
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I have read this statement or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I
understand its provisions. I know that I am free to change or delete anything contained in
this statement. I do not wish to make any changes because all of the statements are correct.
18.

I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney.

19.

1 an i -V / years of age; 1 ha \ - e attended school throi igh the

grade ai id

I can read ai id understand the English language or <MI interpreter has been provided to me. I
was not under the influence of any drugs, medication or intoxicants which would impair my
judgment when the decision was made to enter the plea(s). I am not presently under the
influence of any drug, medication or intoxicants which impair my judgment.
20.

I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind, mentally capable of

understanding the proceedings and the coi iseqi lences of my plea, and free of any mental
disease, defect or impairmeni thdl would prevent me from knowingly, intelligently and
voluntarily entering my plea.
DATED this ./ - / day of

/
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DEFEND A!

CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY
I certify
a v

••: . <::••.

!

''JS- UvLl<

(L _j '(-t.JU I. the defendant

i statement or that I have read it to him/her and I

have discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its
contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief,
after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the

0f)fl9Q

defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated and these, along with the other representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true.
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ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT/BAR #

CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against.
/ /•'

&•'•-''-

J

/.

- */-*-. '~-''~'-<

defendant. I have reviewed this statement of the defendant and find that

the declaration, including the elements of the offense of the charge(s) and the factual synopsis
of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the offense are true and correct. No
improper inducements, threats or coercion to encourage a plea have been offered defendant.
The plea negotiations are fully contained in the statement and in the attached plea agreement
or as supplemented on record before the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the
evidence would support the conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s)
is/are entered and the acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public injereSt?

PROSECUTING ATT
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ORDER

Based upon tl ite facts set nnili mi iiitt nursling slateiIICIIt ami the lenifkauon r>( (lit
defendant and counsel, the Court witnesses the signatures and fines the defendant's plea(s) of
(guilty) (no contest) is freely and voluntarily made and it is >o ordered that the defendant's
plea(s) of (guilty) (no contest) to the charge(s) set fortlyn the statement be accepted and
entered.
IH INI IN l 'OMPT HIM. _?Z.

day ol

, / V ^ * ^

'/*£—- m
DISTRICT JUDGE
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ADDENDUM B

LEGISLATIVE FLOOR DEBATE ON
HOUSE BILL 3
Lavs of Utah 1976, Ch. 9, § 1
(Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203)

SENATE DEBATE
SENATE BUDGET SESSION
DAY 15—JANUARY 26, 1976
SENATOR RINSTROM'S SECOND AMENDMENT TO HOUSE BILL 3

Sen. Rinstrom:

Nov, Mr. President, a second motion I would
have to amend this bill as follows is again
in those same places, calling your attention
to line 18 after the word "firearm," add
these words: "or a facsimile or the
representation of the same was used in the
commission or furtherance of a felony."

Mr. President:

Or a facsimile or what?

Sen. Rinstrom:

"or a facsimile or the representation of the
same." Now, let me give you the example of
where I'm going. Sorry to report I
represented a young man on an armed robbery
charge. I was successful in finding him
innocent. He later was arrested on a second
one and confessed to eighteen armed robberies
including the one that I had represented him
on, and he'd all done it with a cap pistol.
But the people at the other end of that
barrel didn't know what they were facing, and
they were just as in great a shock and trauma
as if a real gun had been pointed to them.
So I think that we ought to include a
facsimile. Or, this would also include the
man who has his hand in his pocket and points
it at you and says, "I have a gun here, and
if you don't hand over the cash, I'm going to
shoot you." So, what this amendment would do
is saying that if a person uses a gun, its
facsimile, or represents that he has a
firearm, he could equally be sentenced to an
additional five years. That's the purpose of
the amendment.

Mr. President:

Senator Brockbank.
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Sen. Brockbank:

(inaudible) representation of same to
representation of a firearm.

Mr. President:

That's good.

Sen. Brockbank:

Because I think you might refer back to a
facsimile.

Mr. President:

That's right.

Sen. Brockbank:

(inaudible) to firearms.

Sen. Rinstrom:

And the representation of a firearm.

Mr. President:

And that will also have to go into all three
places?

Sen. Rinstrom:

That's correct.

Mr. President:

Okay. That carries a bit more significance
than the other one, I would think, if it
(inaudible) some gesture on the part of the
person as opposed to carrying a real firearm.

Sen. Rinstrom:

I might say that this bill does not deal just
with robberies. It's the commission of any
felony in which a firearm would be used, a
facsimile or the representation.

Mr. President:

Would this be a representation.

Sen. Rinstrom:

I don't think if you pointed your finger at
me that that would be a representation.
But—

Mr. President:

It might look like a gun—

Sen. Rinstrom:

Well-

Mr. President:

to somebody in the dark.

Sen. Rinstrom:

I think a reasonable man, if he was seeing
that, would not conclude that you had a
firearm. If you came up behind me at night
and stuck your finger in your back and said,
"This is a gun. If you don't hand me your
wallet, I'm going to shoot you," that would
be a representation, yes.
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That's a good suggestion.

That's right.

Mr. President:

Any further discussion on the motion?

All in

favor of the motion say, "aye."
Body:

Aye.

Mr. President:

Opposed, "no."

Body:
Mr. President:

No.
The motion carries. If there are no further
questions, then I have a question I want to
ask you, but before I do, Senator Howell.
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